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SECTION 8(b)(4): MERGED PRODUCTS AND
THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS
INTRODUCTION

In the history of the labor movement, the secondary boycott,
in its various forms, has often proved to be one of the most effective weapons in labor's arsenal.' A secondary boycott involves
economic coercion and an attempt to implicate another party or
neutral party in a labor dispute. The practice has been described as "a combination to influence A by exerting some sort
of economic or social pressure against persons who deal with
A."12 The most widely quoted definition is one proposed by
Judge Learned Hand:
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear
not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon
some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him
to stop business with the employer in the hope that this
will induce
3
the employer to give in to his employees' demands.

Prior to modern labor legislation, secondary boycotts had
been condemned at common law on various theories, including
illegal conspiracy, 4 rioting and disturbing the peace,5 and violations of the federal antitrust laws. 6 After enactment of the Nor1. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE BOARD, THE COURTS
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT chs. 1-2 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as MORRIS].
2. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930). In
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), the Supreme Court provided the following definition: "A secondary boycott is where many combine to injure
one in his business by coercing third persons, against their will, to cease
patronizing him by threats of similar injury." Id. at 330; see C. Comella, Inc.
v. United Farmworkers Organizing Comm., 33 Ohio App. 2d 61, 292 N.E.2d
647 (1972). "A secondary boycott ... is union pressure directed at a neutral
employer or secondary employer to induce or coerce him to cease doing
business with a primary employer with whom the union is engaged in a
labor dispute." Id. at 75, 292 N.E.2d at 657. Cf. H. SHERMAN & W. MURPHY,
LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING 236 (3d ed. 1975): "Secondary activity occurs when a union
which has a dispute with a primary employer seeks to bring pressure upon
him through a secondary employer who does business with him."
3. Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37, 25 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2451 (2d
Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 694, 28 L.R.R.M. 2115 (1951).
4. See, e.g., Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97
(1919).
5. See, e.g., People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E.2d 238 (1939).
6. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). For a discussion of the
labor laws and their relation to antitrust law, see BERMAN, LABOR AND THE
SHERMAN ACT (1930); 1 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAw §§ 4.01-4.06 (1978); THORELLI,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1954); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pen-
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ris-LaGuardia Act 7 and the Wagner Act, 8 secondary boycotts
were legalized, 9 and they became an effective means by which
labor was able to force employers to meet its demands. To curb
certain abuses of the secondary boycott, section 8(b) (4) was
added to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act)
by the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 194710 and amended by the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959."
Although the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments provided a general proscription against secondary boycotts, it is still permissible for a union to exert economic
pressure upon employers through handbills and consumer picketing, notwithstanding the fact that such conduct may constitute
a secondary boycott. 12 One of the more common and controversial forms of economic pressure is the consumer boycott. 13 Consumer boycotts often take the form of appeals to the consuming
public not to purchase a product produced by the primary employer and sold or used by a secondary employer. 14 A problem
nington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REV. 317 (1966); DiCola, Labor Antitrust:
Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 705
(1972); Feller & Anker, Analysis of Impact of Supreme Court's Antitrust
Holdings, 59 L.R.R.M. 103 (1965).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
8. 49 Stat. 449 (1939) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq.).
9. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 7 L.R.R.M. 267 (1941);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 6 L.R.R.M. 647 (1940). See also
NLRB v. P.C. Kohler Swiss Chocolate Co., 130 F.2d 503, 10 L.R.R.M. 852 (2d
Cir. 1942), where the court held that under the original language of the
NLRA, secondary boycotts should be considered a "protected activity."
10. The relevant portions of the Taft-Hartley Amendments,
§ 8(b) (4) (A), provide:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any service, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employee or self-employed person to join
any labor or employee organization or any employee or other person to
cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person.
61 Stat. 141 (1947).
11. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). See note 29 infra.
12. In certain cases secondary consumer activity is permitted due to
first amendment considerations. Compare Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 68 L.R.R.M. 2209 (1968) and Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 6 L.R.R.M. 697 (1940) with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507, 91 L.R.R.M. 2489 (1976) and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
13. R. DERESHINSKY, THE NLRB AND SEcONDARY BoYcoTrs 73 (1972).
14. Id.; see, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961 (1964); NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377
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arises,, however, when a union engages in a lawful secondary
boycott against a secondary employer whose business is dependent on the product produced by the primary employer. This
problem has proved significantly troublesome for both the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board.
A partial solution was provided in American Bread Co. v.
NLRB. 15 The American Bread decision introduced a new concept to the field of labor law and consumer picketing, known as
the "merged products" doctrine. 16 This doctrine protects the
secondary employer where the products produced by the primary and secondary employers have become so integrated that
they lose their separate identities. 17 In enunciating this new
doctrine, however, the court failed to articulate standards to govern the determination of whether a primary employer's product
has "merged" with a product produced by a secondary employer.
The purpose of this article is to attempt, through a discussion of the legislative history of section 8(b) (4) and the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) and
federal courts, to formulate standards for such a determination.
It is the author's contention that the articulation of definitive
standards would aid in lessening the confusion prevailing
among practitioners, management, and labor in this complex
area of labor relations. 18 It is hoped that the Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local
100119 will ultimately produce workable principles.
U.S. 46, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957 (1964); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147,
71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 952, 68 L.R.R.M. 3004 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
15. 170 N.L.R.B. 91, 67 L.R.R.M. 1427 (1968), enforced in part,411 F.2d 147,
71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969).
16. Id. See text accompanying notes 61-66 infra.
17. 411 F.2d 147, 154, 71 L.R.R.M. 2243, 2249 (6th Cir. 1969). As the court
explained, "[T] he picketing of these restaurants produced illegal secondary
boycotts since the subject matter of the picketing had become so integrated

into the food served that to cease purchasing the single item [bread] would
almost amount to customers stopping all trade with the secondary employer."
18. The provisions governing secondary and consumer boycotts have
been described by Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1086, 1113 (1960), as "surely one of the most

labyrinthine provisions ever included in a federal labor statute."
19. 100 S. Ct. 658 (Jan. 7, 1980) (No. 79-672).
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8(b) (4)

The Landrum-Griffin Amendments

20

In 1954, with concern growing over internal union activities,
a Senate investigation was initiated by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field, chaired by Senator McClellan. The McClellan Committee
focused its attention on the issue of union racketeering and corruption.2 1 In March, 1958, the committee released its first interim report calling on Congress to take certain action to curb
union abuses and resolve jurisdictional disputes in cases which
22
the National Labor Relations Board had declined to decide.
In attempting to reach a satisfactory solution with respect to
20. Prior to the enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments, the
federal labor policy was embodied in the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), and later, in the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The changes
made in the Taft-Hartley Act reflected the shift in federal labor policy from
protecting employee organizing rights, collective bargaining rights, and
rights to engage in concerted economic activity, towards a more balanced
statutory scheme which also proscribed certain union conduct.
The major function of the Wagner Act was to guarantee employees the
right to organize. After a series of strikes during and after World War II, a
cry for labor reform arose in Congress. The several problem areas
spotlighted by the congressional hearings were secondary boycotts, strikes
and picketing, and union corruption.
Unlike the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited not only
employer misconduct, but also union misconduct. Section 8(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b), was added to the Wagner Act and prohibited restraint or coercion
by a union and discrimination against employees by a union. It also
imposed a duty on employee representatives to bargain collectively; it
outlawed various secondary boycotts, and prohibited featherbedding.
For a discussion of the pre-Wagner Act period, see S. MORISON, THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 937-77 (1965). For discussions of
the legislative history of the Wagner Act, see generally 1 T. KHEEL, LABOR
LAW § 5.01 (1978); MORRIS, supra note 1, at 3-34; Keyserling, The Wagner Act:
Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199 (1960). For
discussions of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, see generally 1
T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 5.02 (1978); H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE
WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY (1950); MORRIS, supra note 1, at 35-48; Reilly,
The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285
(1960).
For a compilation of all relevant legislative materials pertaining to the
Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, see NLRB, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935 (1936) (2 vols.) [hereinafter
cited as LEG. HIST. NLRA] and NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
LEG. HIST.

21. 1 T.

1947 (1948) (2 vols.) [hereinafter cited as

LMRAJ.
KHEEL, LABOR

LAW

§

5.03[d] (1978). For a discussion of the po-

litical make-up of the McClellan Committee, see A.
POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION

LAW

McADAMS, POWER AND

36-40 (1964). See also

THE LABOR REFORM

(BNA 1959).

22. The McClellan Committee urged Congress to take action that would:
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the McClellan Committee findings, 23 Congress considered no
less than five separate bills between January and August, 1959.24
The Senate passed the Kennedy-Ervin Bill;25 the House passed
the Landrum-Griffin Bill.26 A conference committee met to consolidate the two, 27 resulting in the present secondary boycott

provisions embodied in the Landrum-Griffin Amendments.
The Present Secondary Boycott Provisions
Section 8(b) (4), as enacted by the Taft-Hartley Amendments, was found to contain several serious loopholes 28 and
therefore was modified to its present form in the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.29 The chief effect of the Landrum-Griffin Amend1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Regulate and control pension, health, and welfare funds;
Regulate and control union funds;
Insure union democracy;
Curb activities of middlemen in labor-management disputes;
Clarify the no-man's land in labor-management disputes.
TAYLOR & WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAw 474 (1971).
23. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958).
24. The Kennedy-Ervin Bill, S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (the bill
was given a new number, S. 1555, on March 25, 1959); The Elliot Bill, H.R.
8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); The Landrum Bill, H.R. 8400, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); and the identical Griffin Bill, H.R. 8401, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959). Also introduced at various times were the Administration Bill (introduced by Sen. Goldwater) S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), the Kearns
Bill, H.R. 3540, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), the Mundt Bill, S. 1002, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). In all, over 15 major bills dealing with labor reform
were introduced in the 86th Congress. See 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (1960) at
vii-xi [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. LMRDA].
For a discussion of the various bills introduced and some of their provisions, see 1 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 5.03[2] (1978).
25. 105 CONG. REC. 6048 (1959), reprintedin II LEG. HIST. LMRDA, supra
note 24, at 1257.
26. 105 CONG. REC. 14,519 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. HIST. LMRDA,
supra note 24, at 1701-02.
27. The major differences between the two bills were:
1) Hot Cargo Provisions. The House version barring hot cargo
agreements between a union and any employer was adopted. The Senate version applied only to agreements with common carriers.
2. Recognitional and OrganizationalPicketing. The Committee
adopted the House version which barred picketing if another union had
been recognized by the employer, or if a valid election had been held
within the past 12 months (the Senate bill called for nine months), or if
picketing had continued for 30 days or less, and an election petition had
not been filed. The Senate bill had no comparable provision.
See generally Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REV. 851, 855 (1960).
28. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
29. Section 704(a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act amends § 8(b) (4) of TaftHartley and provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents:
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
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ments, according to then Senator John F. Kennedy, was "to plug
loopholes in the secondary boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. There [had] never been any dispute about the desira'30
bility of plugging these artificial loopholes.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959,31 also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, 32 consists of
seven titles. 33 Of particular importance is Title VII which
amended, among other provisions, section 8(b) (4) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-Hartley) to tighten
up the "loopholes" in the 1947 Act's secondary boycott provisions. 34

The three major loopholes in

the original section

8(b) (4) were: (1) Since only inducement of employees was proany person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce

to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is:
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or
bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9: Provided,
That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing;
. . . Providedfurther, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4)
only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have
an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than
the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick
up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at
the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution ....
73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4).
30. 105 CONG. REC. 16,413 (1959), reprinted in IILEG. HiST. LMRDA,
supra note 24, at 1431-32.
31. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187, 401-503.
32. The names "Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959," "LMRDA," "Landrum-Griffin," "Landrum-Griffin Amendments," and
"Landrum-Griffin Act" all refer to the same legislation and will be used interchangeably.
33. Titles I-VI are concerned exclusively with the regulation of internal
union affairs. For a discussion of Titles I-VI, see 1 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAw
§§ 5.03[3] [a]-[f] (1978).
34. 61 Stat. 141 (1947).
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scribed, direct inducement of a supervisor of the secondary employer by threats of labor was not prohibited; 35 (2) Since only a
strike or a concerted refusal was prohibited, pressure upon a
single employee was not forbidden; 36 and (3) Railroads, airlines,
and municipalities were not employers under Taft-Hartley, and
37
therefore inducement of their employees was not unlawful.
The applicability of section 8(b) (4) was expanded to make it
an unfair labor practice for any labor organization to put pressure on "any person" for any purpose proscribed by the section.
Section 8(b) (4) was also amended to prohibit a labor organization from engaging in coercive or threatening conduct in order to
attain any of8 the goals described in sections 8(b) (4) (A), (B),
3
(C), or (D).
35. Section 2(3) of Taft-Hartley provides that the term employee "shall
not include .

.

. any individual employed as a supervisor." 61 Stat. 138

(1947). See, e.g., Humphrey v. Local 294, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 25
L.R.R.M. 2318 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) and Teamsters Local 505, 130 N.L.R.B. 1438, 47
L.R.R.M. 1502 (1961), where attempted inducement of a job foreman was unlawful because the foreman's interests were more closely identified with
the rank and file than with the management.
36. Section 8(b) (4) of Taft-Hartley prohibited encouraging employees
to engage in "a strike or concerted refusal" to use, sell, transport, etc. any
goods for a proscribed object. 61 Stat. 141 (1947) (emphasis supplied). See,
e.g., NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 28 L.R.R.M. 2105
(1951). "[Union pressures on individual employees] only as they happen to
approach the picketed place of business generally are not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such employees." Id.
at 671, 28 L.R.R.M. at 2107 (emphasis supplied).
37. The Taft-Hartley Act, in section 2(2), expressly excepts persons subject to the Railway Labor Act from the definition of employer and further
excepts from the definition of employee, in section 2(3), any individual employed as an agricultural laborer. 61 Stat. 137-38 (1947). See, e.g., Lumber &
Sawmill Workers Local 2409, 122 N.L.R.B. 1403, 43 L.R.R.M. 1324, enf. denied
sub nom. Great N. Ry. v. NLRB, 272 F.2d 741,45 L.R.R.M. 2206 (9th Cir. 1959);
UAW Local 83, 116 N.L.R.B. 267, 38 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1956); Teamsters Local 87,
87 N.L.R.B. 720, 25 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1949), enforced sub nom. Di Giorgio Fruit
Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642, 28 L.R.R.M. 2022 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (agricultural
organization).
38. As provided by § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4), the proscribed actions are:
(i) to engage in or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities
or to perform any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by section 8(e) [hot cargo agreements];
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
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Significantly, however, the amended section 8(b) (4) permitted union publicity other than picketing, such as by handbilling,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public that there exists
a primary dispute with an employer, and that the primary employer's products are being distributed by another, or secondary, employer. Such publicity is not protected, however, if it
has the effect of inducing secondary boycotts. Thus, publicity
other than picketing which induces employees of employers
other than the primary employer to refuse to handle any goods
39
or perform any services is prohibited.
However, handbilling without picketing is a protected activity so long as deliveries and services to the secondary employer
are not interrupted. The publicity proviso, which protects
handbilling, was the compromise reached by the conference
committee and was prompted by first amendment considerations. 40 It permits unions to distribute handbills at the seconwith any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been
certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9: Provided,That nothing contained in this clause
(B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9;
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade,
craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is
failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing
such work ....
39. The proviso to § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4), added by the Landrum-Griffin Amendments reads:
Providedfurther,That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that
a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing
any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or
transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution ....
(emphasis
supplied).
40. For discussions of the constitutional aspects of picketing and
handbilling, see C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 346-48 (rev. ed. 1949);
Cox, Strikes, Picketing, and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574 (1951);
Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech. A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943);
Etelson, Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 10 J. MAR. J. 1 (1976); Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N.C.L. REV. 158 (1932); Lewis,
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dary employer's shop, place advertisements in newspapers,
make announcements over the radio, and to engage in any publicity short of ambulatory picketing in front of the secondary
site.4 1 It is the interpretation and application of section 8(b) (4)
by the Board and reviewing courts which has presented management, labor, and especially labor lawyers with extensive
problems and distinctions "more nice than obvious" 42 in the
area of consumer boycotts.
CONSUMER PICKETING AND THE RISE OF MERGED PRODUCTS

The early Board decisions under the 1959 Landrum-Griffin
Amendments strictly adhered to what the Board believed was
the intention of Congress in amending section 8(b) (4) to prohibit secondary consumer boycotts. 43 In Perfection Mattress &
Spring Co. v. NLRB," during fourteen days of union picketing
activity at retail department stores which were customers of primary employer Perfection Mattress, no deliveries to the secondary employers were stopped, no neutral employee quit or
refused to work, and no retail department store employees refused to handle Perfection's goods. Picketing was conducted after department store employees arrived for work and before
they exited for home. The picket signs were addressed to the
consuming public and urged consumers not to buy mattresses
manufactured by Perfection.
The Board concluded that since the purpose of picketing the
retail stores was to force the cessation of business dealings between those store owners and Perfection, the picketing was prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). 45 The Board also held that
the fact that the union's appeal was directed to the consumer
did not bring the union activity within the publicity proviso. In
other words, secondary consumer picketing was not intended to
Free Speech and Property Rights Re-Equated: The Supreme Court Ascends
From Logan Valley, 24 LAB. L.J. 195 (1973); Owens, Plazas, Parking Lots,
and Picketing: Logan Valley Plaza is Put to the Test, 23 LAB. L.J. 742 (1972);
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV.L. REV. 180 (1942); Comment,
The First Amendment and Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act: A
Union'sRight to Picket in the PrivatelyOwned "Public"Forum, 8 U. TOL. L.
REV. 437 (1977); Note, Shopping CenterPicketing: The Impact of Hudgens v.
National Labor Relations Board, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 812 (1977).
41. See 105 CONG. REC. 16,413 (1959), reprinted in II LEG. HIST. LMRDA,

supra note 24, at 1431-32 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
42. Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674, 48 L.R.R.M.
2210, 2213 (1961).

43. United Wholesale Employees Local 261, 129 N.L.R.B. 1014, 47
L.R.R.M. 1121 (1960), enforced sub nom. Perfection Mattress & Spring Co. v.
NLRB, 321 F.2d 612, 53 L.R.R.M. 2800 (5th Cir. 1963).
44. Id.
45. 129 N.L.R.B. at 1014, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
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6
be protected. 4

The Board followed this reasoning in Upholsterers Frame &
Bedding Workers Local 61. 4 7 However, in that case, the Board
distinguished between the union's unlawful secondary consumer picketing at the department stores and the union's protected right to engage in handbilling truthfully advising the
public of its primary dispute with Perfection Mattress. Noting
that picketing and handbilling were two separate and distinct
forms of informational activity, the Board held that the latter
was protected by the publicity proviso, 48 whereas consumer
picketing was banned by section 8(b) (4). It reasoned that the
picketing, if carried on for a proscribed purpose, was prohibited
by section 8(b) (4) because it invited employees to engage in
work stoppages, thereby coercing secondary employers in the
conduct of their businesses. Handbilling, however, would not
have invited employees to engage in work stoppages and was
49
thus protected by the publicity proviso.
Thus, in its early decisions the NLRB effectuated the policy
of the statute by protecting secondary employers, while promoting the interests of unions to convey information and publicize
their disputes with primary employers. 50 The Board had struck
an accommodation between the rights of neutral secondary employers not to be coerced in the conduct of their businesses and
allowing unions to engage in informational activity. Between
1959 and 1964 the case law regarding union appeals to the consuming public became well established. This period of stable
labor law terminated, however, in 1964 with the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Ware51
housemen Local 760 (Tree Fruits).
46. Id. at 1023,47 L.R.R.M. at 1123. "[T]he proviso is explicitly limited to
publicity 'other than picketing.'" See also II LEG. HIST. LMRDA, supra note
24, at 1615 (remarks of Rep. Griffin).
47. 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 48 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1961), enf. denied sub nom. NLRB
v. Upholsterers Frame &Bedding Workers Local 61, 331 F.2d 561, 56 L.R.R.M.
2164 (8th Cir. 1964). The court's refusal to enforce the Board's order was
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Tree Fruits.
48. While the proviso to section 8(b)(4) does not define the permissive publicity, the legislative history makes it abundantly clear that the
Senate and House Conferees, who drafted the proviso, intended
thereby to confer, subject to certain conditions, immunity on all forms
of informational activity by unions, except picketing.
132 N.L.R.B. at 46, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1306.
49. Id. at 47, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1307.
50. R. DERESHINSKY, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BoYcorrs 78-80 (1972);
see Brewery Workers Local 366, 121 N.L.R.B. 271, 42 L.R.R.M. 1350 (1958).
51. 377 U.S. 58, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961 (1964). For a discussion of Tree Fruits,
see Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of
Tree Fruits,49 MrNN. L. REV. 479 (1965).
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The Tree Fruits Decision
In Tree Fruits, the union struck certain fruit packers and
warehousemen who sold Washington State apples to the
Safeway chain of retail stores. All of the Safeway stores in the
Seattle area were picketed. 52 Strikers distributed handbills and
carried placards appealing to consumers to refrain from
purchasing Washington State apples. The pickets were instructed to stay away from delivery entrances and were forbidden to request customers not to patronize the stores. No
or delivattempts were made to prevent customers, employees,
53
stores.
the
leaving
or
entering
from
erymen
The Board concluded that the union had engaged in prohibited secondary activity. Adhering to its prior decisions, the
Board again reasoned that, according to the literal language of
the proviso to section 8(b) (4) and its legislative history, consumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment was prohibited. 54 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order on the ground that
there was no specific finding of the union's use of threats, coerobjectives prohibited by
cion, or restraint to achieve any of the
55
section 8(b) (4) (A), (B), (C), or (D).
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision,
reasoning that not every instance of consumer picketing at a
secondary employer's premises was prohibited. 56 The Court
held that a union may peacefully picket a neutral party when
the object is to persuade customers not to purchase the struck
product. The union could not, however, urge customers to com57
The
pletely cease doing business with the neutral party.
52. The picket signs read: "To the Consumer: Non-Union Washington
State Apples are being sold in this store. Please do not purchase such apples. Thank you. Teamsters Local 760, Yakima, Washington." 377 U.S. at 60
n.3, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2962 n.3.
53. These facts are the same as those presented in Perfection Mattress
and UpholsterersFrame & Bedding Workers Local 61. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
54. 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 48 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1961).
55. 308 F.2d 311, 50 L.R.R.M. 2392 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

56. "[Ilt does not follow from the fact that some coercive conduct was

protected by the [publicity] proviso, that the exception, 'other than picketing,' indicates that Congress had determined that all consumer picketing

was coercive." 377 U.S. at 69, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2966.

In order for consumer picketing to be lawful, other requirements must
be met. The picket signs must limit their appeals to the struck product.
Carpenters Local 550, 227 N.L.R.B. 196, 94 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1976). The picket
signs must adequately identify the struck product and the primary employer. Meat Cutters Local 248, 230 N.L.R.B. 189, 96 L.R.R.M. 1221 (1977); see
MoRis,

supra note 1, at 602-03. See also Paper Workers Local 832, 236

N.L.R.B. No. 183, 98 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1978).

57. 377 U.S. at 72, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2967.
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Supreme Court's decision created an exception to the total prohibition of consumer picketing, but it has spawned considerable
criticism. 5 8

It has proved difficult to apply in certain cases,

namely where the primary employer's product has become integrated with the product of the secondary employer.
The Doctrine of American Bread
The Board and federal courts, in applying the Tree Fruits
doctrine, have encountered the problem of whether consumer
picketing, proper under Tree Fruits,was still legal where the primary's product had become integrated into the secondary's
product. In other words, was consumer picketing permitted
where it was difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to avoid
purchasing the primary employer's product without simultaneously boycotting the entire business of the secondary employer?
A partial answer to 9this question was supplied by American
5
Bread Co. v. NLRB.
In American Bread, the union had a dispute with a bread
producer and set up picket lines outside certain restaurants, advising customers that the struck bread was being served inside.
The Board held that the Tree Fruits doctrine was inapplicable
since the struck product had become so integrated into the retailer's product that any bread boycott would necessarily result
in a total cessation of business between the secondary employer
and consumers. 60 Therefore, the Board found that the union
had engaged in unlawful consumer picketing in violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's order,6 1 noting that a customer has no choice in the brand of bread
served with the meals prepared by a restaurant. 62 Thus, the
touchstone of consumer picketing where products have merged
is the ability or inability of consumers to respond in a sufficiently limited manner by refraining from purchases of the
struck product.
Where only tangible products have been involved, application of the "merged products" doctrine has been relatively un58. See 377 U.S. at 80, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2970 (Harlan, J., dissenting); R. DERESHINSKY, THE

NLRB

AND SECONDARY

BoYcors 82-84 (1972).

59. 170 N.L.R.B. 91,67 L.R.R.M. 1427 (1968), enforced in part,411 F.2d 147,
71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969) (also involved issue concerning representation).
60. NLRB v. Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37, 401 F.2d 952, 68
L.R.R.M. 3004 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
61. 411 F.2d 147, 71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969).

62. "[The bread] had become so integrated into the food served that to
cease purchasing the single item would almost amount to customers stopping all trade with the secondary employer." Id. at 154, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2249.
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complicated. 6 3 If consumers can recognize the struck product
and refrain from buying only that product, the picketing is lawful. 64 The most problematic "merged products" situations occur
when the secondary employer or retailer sells only the primary's product, 65 or where the primary employer provides a
66
service to the secondary employer.
SINGLE-PRODUCT SECONDARY EMPLOYERS

In Steelworkers Local 14055 (Dow Chemical) ,67 Dow Chemical, which produced gasoline at its Bay Refining Division, had a
dispute with a steelworkers local. The union struck the division
and also picketed six independently-owned gas stations which
received their revenues from the sale of gasoline produced at
the Bay Refining Division. The Board found that nearly all the
business of each station consisted of gasoline sales and incidental services. 68 It distinguished Tree Fruits on the ground that
picketing the gas stations was reasonably calculated to induce
customers not to patronize the establishment since most of their
sales were of gasoline. 69 Thus, the Board determined that the
63. Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers Local 61, 331 F.2d 561, 56
L.R.R.M. 2164 (8th Cir. 1964) (enforcement denied); Salem Bldg. Trades
Council, 163 N.L.R.B. 33, 64 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1967), enforced sub nom. NLRB v.
Salem Bldg. Trades Council, 388 F.2d 987, 67 L.R.R.M. 2512 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 965, 68 L.R.R.M. 2353 (1968); see NLRB v. Twin City
Carpenters Dist. Council, 422 F.2d 309, 73 L.R.R.M. 2371 (8th Cir. 1970), enforcing 167 N.L.R.B. 1017, 66 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1967); Independent Routemen's
Ass'n, 206 N.L.R.B. 245, 84 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1973); Cement Masons Local 337,
192 N.L.R.B. 377, 77 L.R.R.M. 1825 (1971) (supplementing 190 N.L.R.B. 261, 77
L.R.R.M. 1255 (1971)), enforced sub nom. Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local
337, 468 F.2d 1187, 81 L.R.R.M. 2641 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Danielson v. Fur
Dressers Local 2F, 411 F. Supp. 655, 90 L.R.R.M. 2820 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), where
the court denied the Board's request for injunctive relief against two unions
who were picketing at the premises of a New York fur skin importer with
picket signs appealing to consumers to save union jobs by refusing to buy
Argentine-dressed fur skins imported and sold by the firm.
64. This statement must be qualified by the assumption that the pickets
limit their appeals to the struck product and that the picket signs adequately identify the struck product and the primary employer. The picket
signs must also be addressed specifically to the consumer. See note 56
supra.
65. See Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Tree Fruits. 377 U.S. at 83,
55 L.R.R.M. at 2970.
66. See text accompanying notes 80-90 infra.
67. 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 86 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1974), enf. denied sub nom. Steelworkers Local 14055 v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 853, 90 L.R.R.M. 3281 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
vacated, 429 U.S. 807, 93 L.R.R.M. 2362, dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302,
96 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1977).
68. 211 N.L.R.B. at 651, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1382.
69. [Here] the picketing was reasonably calculated to induce customers not to patronize the neutral parties, in this case the gas station operators, at all. Even though some of the stations involved sell tires and
provide repair service, which special aspects of their business might be
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union had violated section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).
In refusing to enforce the NLRB order, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Board's interpretation of Tree Fruits
and held that consumer picketing was not made unlawful
merely because a large percentage of the retail stations' income
was earned from sales of Bay gasoline. 70 The court believed that
although the effect of a successful consumer boycott may have
been economically harmful to the gas station owners, the picketing was not conduct which Congress had intended to prohibit in
section 8(b) (4).71 The court held that the public policy favoring
the right of a union to peacefully publicize a dispute outweighed
any possible loss to a secondary employer. 72 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court did not rule on the merits; it reversed the court
of appeals and remanded the case to the Board for reconsidera73
tion in light of intervening circumstances.
An inconsistent result was reached in Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco).7 4 In that case the union had a dispute
with Safeco, a company which issued title insurance policies.
Contract negotiations reached an impasse. The union picketed
Safeco and five land title insurance companies whose policies
were underwritten by Safeco, urging consumers to cancel their
insurance policies. Ninety to ninety-five percent of each land title company's total income was derived from the issuance of
Safeco title policies. The Board followed its reasoning in Dow
Chemical7 5 and concluded that a successful boycott of Safeco
insurance policies would predictably involve a virtually comrelatively unimpaired, most of their business is gasoline sales and mi-

nor items incidental thereto. Some, at least, would predictably be
forced out of business ... and all would predictably be squeezed to a
position of duress .... It is not only the potential impact of the picketing, however, that distinguishes this case from Tree Fruits. It is, more
importantly, the predictability of such impact that leads us to conclude
that the picketing had an unlawful object.

Id. at 651-52, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1383.
70. This picketing, we think, cannot reasonably be held to have been
aimed at "all trade" of Alexander's under the reasoning of the Court in
Tree Fruits. As the Court there held, picketing "confined as it was to
persuading customers to cease buying the product of the primary employer" (citation omitted) did not fall within the area Congress clearly
indicated an intention to prohibit under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and,
therefore, did not "threaten, coerce, or restrain". ...
Steelworkers Local 14055 v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 853, 858-59, 90 L.R.R.M. 3281, 3284
(D.C. Cir. 1975).

71. Id. at 857, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3283.
72. Id. at 859, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3285.
73. 429 U.S. 807, 93 L.R.R.M. 2362 (1976).
74. 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 93 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1976), enforced, 99 L.R.R.M. 3330
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
75. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
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plete boycott of the neutral land title companies. 76 The District
of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Board and enforced the
7
order finding a section 8(b) (4) violationJ
Dow Chemical and Safeco demonstrate the difficulties encountered in applying the merged products doctrine to the single product secondary employer. The Board was consistent in
its reasoning in both cases. The Board felt that due to the predictable effect a successful consumer boycott would have on the
secondary employer, forcing it out of business, the union's consumer appeal constituted coercion of neutral employers within
the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). 78 The court of appeals,
however, took disparate approaches to the issues presented by
those cases.
In Dow Chemical, the court correctly noted that the Tree
Fruits decision should not be limited in its application to a factual situation where the struck product constitutes only a small
portion of the business of the secondary retailer. 79 The public
was not asked to withhold its patronage from the secondary employer but only to boycott the primary's goods. This was not a
classic American Bread situation where the public could not refuse to buy the primary's goods without also boycotting the secondary's products. The relationship of the struck product to the
consuming public was still direct because the identity of that
product, gasoline in Dow Chemical and title insurance in
Safeco, had not been lost.
SECONDARY EMPLOYERS WHERE THE PRIMARY'S "PRODUCT" IS A
SERVICE

The confusion resulting from the utilization of the Tree
Fruits analysis in cases involving a single product is matched
when the primary's product is a service. Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB 8 0 involved a union dispute with the
76. 226 N.L.R.B. at 757, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
77. 99 L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "Neither Congress in the legislative history accompanying the 1959 Amendments, nor the Court in its decision in Tree Fruits, intimated that a neutral secondary employer loses his

protection against a union-inspired total boycott if his only item of merchandise is the struck product." Id. at 3333.

78. See Steelworkers Local 14055, 229 N.L.R.B. 302, 96 L.R.R.M. 1090
(1977).

79. The correctness of this reasoning may finally be determined by the
Supreme Court. After the preparation of this article for publication, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 658 (Jan. 7, 1980) (No. 79-672).
80. 167 N.L.R.B. 1030, 66 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1967), enforced, 401 F.2d 952, 68
L.R.R.M. 3004 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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publisher of a "throw away" newspaper. 8 1 The union struck the
newspaper and picketed a privately-owned shopping center
which housed approximately sixty shops. Six of those shops
regularly advertised in the primary employer's newspaper.
Each picket sign named one of the advertisers who was a target
of the picketing.
The Board held Tree Fruits inapplicable. It distinguished
situations where peaceful consumer picketing was used to halt
all trade with the secondary employer and consumer picketing
to persuade customers not to buy the struck product. 82 The
Board held that the union's picketing encouraged total cessation
of business not only with the six establishments who advertised
in the primary's "throw away" newspaper, but with all the stores
in the shopping center. It therefore found that the union's picketing constituted an unlawful consumer boycott in violation of
section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).
The court of appeals, in enforcing the Board's order, noted
that the scope of protection which section 8(b) (4) affords secondary employers, is dependent upon the nature of the secondary's business and the type and extent of picketing employed
by the union. 83 For example, in a Tree Fruits situation where a
secondary employer has a retail business and sells separate and
distinct products, only one of which is the primary's product, a
union may appeal to the consumer not to buy the primary's
product. The consumer is able to respond in accordance with
the union's request without totally ceasing to do business with
the secondary employer. However, in certain situations such as
in the construction 84 or restaurant 5 industries, customers are
81. A "throw away" newspaper is a newspaper which contains only advertising and is distributed to the public free of charge.
82. 167 N.L.R.B. 1030, 66 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1967).
A loss of patronage resulting from the picketing appeal could have
no direct impact upon the restaurants' need for further advertising; indeed a reduction of patronage under normal circumstances might well

lead to a desire and need for more advertising. Thus the picketing of
the restaurants in this case constituted more than a mere following of
the struck product in a Tree Fruits sense; its obvious aim was to cause a
cessation of the secondary employer's dealings with the primary employer, not as a natural consequence of a falling consumer demand, but

by force of the injury that would otherwise be inflicted on their businesses generally.
Id. at 1032, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1196; accord, Los Angeles Typographical Union
No. 174, 181 N.L.R.B. 384, 73 L.R.R.M. 1390 (1970).
83. 401 F.2d 952, 956, 68 L.R.R.M. 3004, 3006 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
84. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 399, 233 N.L.R.B. 718, 96 L.R.R.M. 1575
(1977), enf. denied sub nom. K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228, 100

L.R.R.M. 2416 (3d Cir. 1979). In that case the carpenters' union had a dispute with K &K Construction and picketed at the construction site where K
& K was constructing homes, and at the offices of Panther Valley, Ltd. Panther Valley owned and sold the homes built by K & K. The dispute between
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not able to respond to a union's appeal not to buy the primary's
product without totally discontinuing dealings with the secondary employer.
The Tree Fruits analysis was also held inapplicable in International Union of Operating Engineers Local 139,86 where the
union, in a dispute with a non-union construction contractor,
picketed a telephone company's business office. The public was
urged not to pay twenty percent of each telephone bill until the
telephone company ceased doing business with the primary employer. The contractor constructed manholes and underground
telephone conduits which formed an integral part of the telephone company's operations. The Board held that lawful consumer picketing did not extend to situations where goods or
services produced by the primary employer have lost their identity and become fully merged into the output (telephone service) of the secondary employer being picketed. 87 This holding
was consistent with American Bread because it would have
been impossible for the consumer to cease purchasing the primary's product or service without ceasing to buy the non-struck
product or service. 88 Thus, a limited consumer response, vital to
a lawful secondary consumer boycott under the Tree Fruits
analysis, was not possible. In addition, when the primary employer provides the secondary employer with services which
cannot be separately offered to the public, union appeals to the
consumer to refrain from buying the secondary's products may
be held unlawful. This has occurred in cases involving
janitorial, 89 laundry, 90 and advertising services. 9 1
the union and K &K arose because K &K was not paying its workers the

prevailing union wage. The Board, over a strong dissent by Member Pennello, held that the publication of area-standards disputes was a legitimate
primary activity even though consumers may have been discouraged from

buying Panther Valley homes.
The Third Circuit remanded the case, holding that a legitimate activity,
area-standards picketing, may be unlawful secondary activity. The court

noted that in light of the special circumstances of the construction industry,

the merged-product doctrine would be applicable in almost all cases. The
court went on to state that the lack of any specific exemption from the secondary boycott prohibitions indicates that Congress intended to include
construction unions in the Landrum-Griffin picketing proscriptions. 592
F.2d at 1233, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2420. On remand, the Board accepted the find-

ings and conclusions of the court and found a violation of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 242 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 101 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1979).

85. See American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 91, 67 L.R.R.M. 1427
(1968), enforced in part, 411 F.2d 147, 71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969).

86. 226 N.L.R.B. 759, 93 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1976).
87. Id.
88. See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
89. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 254, Building Serv. Int'l Union, 367 F.2d 227,
63 L.R.R.M. 2307 (10th Cir. 1966). See also NLRB v. Local 254, Building Serv.
Int'l Union, 359 F.2d 289, 61 L.R.R.M. 2709 (lst Cir. 1966).
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CONCLUSION: THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS

It is apparent that since the Supreme Court's decision in
Tree Fruits,92 both the Board and the courts have been searching for standards by which union appeals to consumers can be
governed. The merged products exception to Tree Fruits, announced in American Bread,93 is an example. The congressional intention in enacting and amending section 8(b) (4)' to
outlaw secondary boycotts, though ambiguous, 94 was to close artificial loopholes in order to further restrict the ability of unions
to involve neutral employers in disputes not of their own making. 95 Due to the ambiguous legislative history of the secondary
boycott provisions coupled with first amendment guarantees of
free speech, 96 administrative and judicial attempts to balance
the interests of unions and neutral employers have produced divergent results.
The Court in Tree Fruits struck a balance between the union
and the neutral employer which was acceptable, despite the fact
that the Court had little statutory support for its decision. 97 The
problem is that the Tree Fruits holding was overly broad rather
than limited to its facts. Realizing this, the Board and the courts
have created an exception to the Tree Fruits doctrine. The exception, merged products, has encountered a fate similar to that
of the general rule: it has wrought considerable confusion and
has been applied in situations where it should not have been.
The standards needed to alleviate the disorder produced in
90. See, e.g., Laundry Workers Local 259, 164 N.L.R.B. 426, 65 L.R.R.M.
1091 (1967).
91. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra. But see Great W. Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 61 L.R.R.M. 2364 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1002, 62 L.R.R.M. 2392 (1966).
92. 377 U.S. 58, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961 (1964). For a discussion of Tree Fruits,
see text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
93. 170 N.L.R.B. 91, 67 L.R.R.M. 1427 (1968), enforced in part,411 F.2d 147,
71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969). For a discussion of American Bread, see
text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
94. Compare the majority and minority opinions in Tree Fruits,377 U.S.

58, 55 L.R.R.M. 2961 (1964).
95. See 105 CONG. REC. 16,413 (1959), reprinted in H LEG. HIST. LMRDA,
supra note 24, at 1432 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).

96. This guarantee is embodied in the national labor policy in § 8(c), 29
U.S.C. § 8(c), which provides:

The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of
the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
See note 40 supra.
97. The publicity proviso to § 8(b) (4) expressly exempts picketing from
its protection. See note 39 supra.
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this complex area should be based on the policy of outlawing
secondary boycotts as intended by the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments. A total ban on secondary boycotts,
however, would not be wise. Yet only certain specific types of
secondary boycotts should be permitted.9 8
Where the consumer's response to the union's appeal can
be limited so that the consumer can refrain from buying only the
primary's product, such secondary activity clearly should be allowed. It is part of the national labor policy to protect employees' rights to strike and to put economic pressure on the primary
employer to induce it to meet the union's demands. The fact
that a secondary employer derives a substantial percentage of
its income from the sale of the primary's product should not be
considered in determining the lawfulness of the activity. To focus on such a factor would leave national labor policy at the
mercy of attenuated differences of fact.99
Where the consumer cannot sufficiently limit his response
and refrain from buying only the primary's product, union consumer picketing should be prohibited. In such situations the innocent secondary becomes involved in a primary dispute over
which he has no control. A partial boycott by the consumer is
not possible. To allow such union activity would upset the delicate balance between the competing interests of management
and labor and undermine the purpose of section 8(b) (4).100
It is clear that the current state of the law of consumer boycotts and merged products is as one commentator remarked, "in
a dreadful mess." 10' It is only through a return to the basic labor
policy stated by Congress and a determination of whether the
primary product sought to be boycotted has retained its separate identity or has become integrated into the product of the
secondary employer that clear labor principles will evolve to
regulate the conduct of management and labor. Dwelling on
subtle factual variations merely creates confusion. Only
through the formulation of comprehensive standards will labor
98. These recommendations do not in any way involve the established

law concerning common-situs picketing, the ally doctrine, reserved gate
picketing, and picketing the performance of struck work. See generally R.
DERESHINSKY, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BoycoIrs 5-72 (1972); 8 T.
KHEEL, LABOR LAw §§ 37.01-.02 (1978).
99. See text accompanying notes 67-78 supra.
100. See, e.g., American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 170 N.L.R.B. 91, 67 L.R.R.M.
1427 (1968), enforced in part, 411 F.2d 147, 71 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1969);
Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37, 167 N.L.R.B. 1030, 66 L.R.R.M. 1194,
enforced, 401 F.2d 952, 68 L.R.R.M. 3004 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But see, e.g., Great
W. Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 61 L.R.R.M. 2364 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002, 62 L.R.R.M. 2392 (1966).
101. C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 426 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
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and management be able to conform their conduct to the law
without acting at their peril. Only then will the "path through
the swamp"' 10 2 become easier and more predictable.
Taras R. Proczko

102. Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the
Swamp, 19 KAN. L. REV. 651 (1971).

